No, conscience isn't of much importance to Raskolnikov: he turns around because his self-control, his autonomy fails. If his story would be only a matter of conscience, it would get in touch with the thoughts of such "nihilist" Russian writers of the 1860's as Chernychevsky, Pisarev and Dobruljubov - the people Dostoievski declared his opponents. Understanding his novel as a polemic against nihilism's advocacy of not only rationalism in everything, but also and foremost of the possibility of shaping and governing yourself, I don't favor an interpretation of it that moves in the direction of conscience.
I indeed think children are a "puppet" of societal forces, culture, family, social influences, and certainly their own bodily urges - that, as a matter of fact, is what I stated. Indetermination (indeterminism) issues from determination (determinism) - or at least, it may issue from it, under the right circumstances. I don't think the proverbial child raised by wolves will develop in such a way - or maybe it will, wolves being more social and caring than a lot of people. The point I try to raise is that free will has to be fostered by society in its children (not to mention its older constituents), and that the only possibility for raising it lies in these children's capacity of being determined - in really complex, because often (seemingly?) inconsistent and contradictory ways, making them individuals in whom a lot of different forces keep eachother in check.
It's on that point, where they are keeping eachother in check, until their conclave releases one of them, that free will has to be located. Ofcourse it is determined, a product of decades of determination encompassing the very visuality and language this conclave has to work with. (If you agree that our linguistic skills are determined, by the way, you'll either have to state that free choice involves no language at all, or that determination enters into free will.) In other words, indetermination is determined - a thousand times, by circumstances, hundreds of lines of causality, language, the extent of our rational skills, etc. This determination provides us with the intelligence to discern several options and think them over - and choose between them, freely, because it can choose either the one or the other option, against a background of determination. Balancing on this point of discernal is what we have to teach our children - or maybe not. Raskolnikov did his balancing act and decided that if there was the option to kill, and his will was truly free, he could decide to kill and carry this killing out without any further consequences for his mental health - so he decided that much. Maybe we don't want to overdo any lessons in free will...
I'm against all metaphysics. You seem to say a man can break free from societal influence, but that also encompasses rationality and language - breaking free from those two means becoming an animal, and certainly not moving into the direction of free will. Furthermore, we don't need any metaphysics in order to believe in free will - the state of thinking has made some progress since the nineteenth century, after all. Free will can arise in the realm of physics, in which it ofcourse will be limited to the options the intellect is capable of discerning, and in which it will be determined - and a locus of indetermination. Ofcourse the meaning of the words "determination" and "indetermination" shifts here - adapts itself to 21st century science. And it ought to do so, after the so-called "Linguistic Turn:" indetermination now encompasses several meanings of the word "determination," therefore encompasses determination, in a manner of speaking - just like determination encompasses several meanings of the word "indetermination" (I'm thinking of quantum physics and string theory here), therefore encompassing indetermination. It's no longer a case of pitting words against eachother, no: as we are no longer dealing with metaphysical absolute, semantics become muddled, and that is what we have to adapt to.
At least... you people will have to adapt to my muddled semantics, I guess. I'm sure I can express myself better in my native language, but in English this is as good as it gets - I can't invest too much time in this discussion, after all. If I give it a shot and try to be really clear, I'd guess I'd have to say something like that: freedom and matter no longer have to be seen as mutually exclusive, but meet eachother in a point where no absolutes exist and clear-cut lines get blurred - in understanding this the meaning of our words evolves into something less "clair et distinct," but more in touch with our way of being in this world.